Your Fintech Stack Is Probably Violating “Eventual Consistency of Regulators”

Why this matters this week
Fintech infra used to be “just” card processing and payouts. Now:
- Real-time payments (RTP, FedNow, instant SEPA, UPI equivalents) are landing in production.
- Regulators are tightening expectations around instant fraud/AML controls, not just batch reports.
- Card networks, banks, and local regulators are pushing stronger controls on chargebacks, scams, and sanctions after several high-profile failures.
- Open banking and account-to-account payment schemes are actually being used at scale, not just in slide decks.
Translation: your core payments and risk stack is being dragged from T+1 batch compliance to sub-second compliance surfaces.
If your systems, data model, and team structure still assume:
- Overnight reconciliations
- Manual case handling as the main line of defense
- “We’ll log it and fix it later if needed”
…then you’re not just accruing tech debt; you’re accruing regulatory and financial tail risk.
This post outlines a mental model for the modern fintech infra stack (payments, fraud, AML/KYC, risk, compliance, open banking), where teams actually get burned, and what you can do this week that moves the needle.
What’s actually changed (not the press release)
A few real changes in the operating environment, not just vendor marketing:
- Settlement speed vs. control depth is inverted
Historically:
– Send payment → settle in hours/days → you had time for:
– Batch fraud checks
– Daily AML screening
– Ops review for edge cases
Now with instant rails:
– You often must answer “safe or not?” in < 300 ms, or at least decide whether to:
– Hold
– Step-up authenticate
– Reject
- Regulators expect “design evidence”, not just logs
In multiple jurisdictions, supervisors aren’t only asking “show me the log that you blocked XYZ transaction”; they’re asking:
– Where in your architecture is sanctions screening enforced?
– How do you ensure no bypass path around KYC?
– What is your model risk management for ML-based fraud controls?
Evidence means:
– Data lineage diagrams
– Control coverage matrices
– Versioned model documentation and rollback plans
- More entities in the chain, more liability surfaces
Open banking and embedded finance mean:
– A single transaction can span:
– Your app
– A partner bank
– A third-party KYC vendor
– A card processor
– An open banking aggregator
– End user doesn’t care. Regulator may treat you as responsible anyway.
“Vendor did it” is rarely a winning defense. You’re expected to:
– Validate vendor controls
– Monitor effectiveness
– Have contingency plans
- Adversaries are now “system-aware”
Fraud rings:
– Test rate limits, velocity controls, and 3DS/step-up rules.
– Probe your edge cases (e.g., card-on-file tokenization, refunds, payout rails).
– Share playbooks on which fintechs have slower or weaker controls.
If your stack has predictably slow or manual control paths, you’re on a list somewhere.
How it works (simple mental model)
Useful simplifying model: four planes of a modern fintech infra stack.
-
Transaction Plane (money moves)
- Payment initiation (card, A2A, wallet, RTP)
- Authorizations, captures, payouts, refunds, chargebacks
- Ledger + reconciliation
- Properties:
- Latency-sensitive
- High availability
- Deterministic behavior required
-
Identity Plane (who is this, really?)
- KYC/KYB flows
- Document / biometric checks
- Device fingerprinting
- Account ownership verification (micro-deposits, open banking, bank matching)
- Properties:
- Often async, multi-step
- Interacts heavily with 3rd-party providers
- Has long-lived state (customer risk profile over time)
-
Risk & Fraud Plane (should we allow this?)
- Real-time:
- Rules engine (velocity, geolocation, amount thresholds)
- ML models (transaction scoring, account takeover, mule detection)
- Near-real-time:
- Case management
- Network-level behavior (clusters, rings)
- Properties:
- Probabilistic output
- Needs feature-rich, fresh data
- Needs explainability for regulators and ops
- Real-time:
-
Compliance & Reporting Plane (are we meeting obligations?)
- AML transaction monitoring
- Sanctions and PEP screening
- Regulatory reporting (SAR/STR, transaction reports)
- Policy enforcement (per-country limits, product restrictions)
- Properties:
- Historically batch; now moving toward near-real-time for high-risk flows
- Heavy audit and documentation needs
- Many jurisdiction-specific rules
Key insight:
You cannot afford to mix these planes haphazardly in the same code paths and DB tables.
- The transaction plane wants minimal branching, idempotent operations, and clear failure modes.
- Risk/compliance planes want maximum context, branching, and experimentation.
The minimal viable architecture:
- Synchronous guardrail layer:
- A small, carefully-curated subset of risk/compliance controls that run in the critical path:
- Sanctions hits for certain corridors
- Gross anomalies (amount > X, jurisdiction bans)
- Very high-risk known patterns
- A small, carefully-curated subset of risk/compliance controls that run in the critical path:
- Async enrichment and monitoring layer:
- Streaming or event-driven pipeline:
- Payments → events → feature stores → ML/rules → alerts/holds
- Supports:
- Post-transaction flags
- Adjusted limits
- Step-up verification next-time
- Streaming or event-driven pipeline:
You only put into the synchronous layer what you’re willing to defend to the CFO and regulator as a reason for customer friction.
Where teams get burned (failure modes + anti-patterns)
1. “We’ll run it as a cron job”
Pattern:
– New regulation or risk requirement arrives.
– Team implements:
– Nightly job:
– Re-scan all customers against updated sanctions list
– Re-score transactions for new fraud signal
– Assumes:
– “We’ll catch it by next day; that’s fine.”
Failure:
– Instant payment scheme goes live.
– Money leaves the ecosystem irreversibly in seconds.
– By the time your job runs, you’re left with:
– Fraud losses
– Potential reporting failures
– Regulator asking why control wasn’t near-real-time
Mitigation:
– Separate:
– Preventive (must be before movement) vs.
– Detective (can be after, but requires response plan)
– Implement real-time checks on:
– High-risk corridors
– High-value thresholds
– Suspicious identity markers
2. Shared DB table for everything
Pattern:
– transactions table holds:
– Core payment states
– Fraud flags
– AML indicators
– Free-text notes from analysts
– Various services poke at this table directly.
Failure:
– Schema change for a business feature breaks:
– AML reports
– Risk models
– Batch exports to your bank partner
– Incident triggered not by infra outage, but by silent data drift.
Mitigation:
– Define canonical payment event schema, append-only.
– Derive specialized views:
– Risk view
– Compliance view
– Ops view
– For the ledger: strong boundaries and minimal dependencies.
3. “The vendor does that for us”
Pattern:
– Outsource:
– KYC
– Sanctions screening
– Transaction monitoring
– Assume that passing the regulator’s questionnaire to the vendor is enough.
Failure examples:
– Vendor had an outage, your fallback path: “temporarily skip KYC” is discovered later.
– Vendor’s config doesn’t match your policy (e.g., different thresholds or risk appetite).
– Vendor’s PEP/sanctions lists are updated slower than expected; regulator cites this as a gap.
Mitigation:
– For each vendor control, document:
– What policy requirement does it satisfy?
– How do you monitor effectiveness?
– What is the degradation mode if it fails? (block vs allow vs partial)
4. Unverifiable ML models in production
Pattern:
– Rapidly deploy ML fraud models:
– Black-box vendor or internal but poorly documented
– On-call team can’t explain decisions.
– Compliance team can’t articulate why transactions were blocked or allowed.
Failure:
– Regulator or card scheme audit asks:
– “Explain why this customer was treated differently.”
– You don’t have:
– Feature versioning
– Model version lineage
– Reason codes
Mitigation:
– Enforce:
– Model contracts: inputs, outputs, version
– Reason codes and top features logged per decision
– Ability to override with deterministic rules in exceptional cases
Practical playbook (what to do in the next 7 days)
You’re not rebuilding your entire fintech infrastructure this week. You can, however, improve your safety margin meaningfully.
1. Map your “hard stops” on money movement
Deliverable (half-day):
- Take your main flows:
- Card funding → wallet
- Wallet → payout
- Bank transfer in/out
- Open banking payment
-
For each flow, write a simple table:
- What synchronous checks run before the money moves?
- What async checks run after the money moves?
- For each check, what is the max latency tolerated?
You’ll usually find:
– Critical flows with no real synchronous controls
– Controls that rely on batch jobs but should be closer to real-time
Pick one obviously risky point and:
– Add a simple synchronous guard:
– Thresholds on amount
– Known-bad counterparty lists
– Sanctions checks for certain destinations
2. Inventory vendors and their degradation paths
Deliverable (one day):
- List vendors in the risk/AML/KYC/compliance path.
- For each:
- What happens if they fail open vs fail closed?
- How do you detect partial degradation (e.g., increased latency, stale data)?
- Who decides to change behavior during an incident?
At minimum:
– Create a runbook:
“If Vendor X is degraded, we [block / reduce limits / move to backup] for flows A, B, C.”
3. Make a minimal “control ownership” matrix
Deliverable (half-day):
- Rows: controls (e.g., sanctions screening, PEP screening, 3DS enforcement, velocity checks,
